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INTRODUCTION

The reason that fisheries economics has developed as a special
area of concentration is that the poorly defined property rights to
fish stocks that normally exist will cause the freely competitive
market to utilize the fishery in a suboptimal manner. The economic problem is to find policies that can correct this. The policies that are successful are those that, in one way or another, assign property rights.1 Proper operation of international fisheries
requires the definition of property rights on two levels. First,
the living resources of the ocean must be divided up among the
the various countries and second, each country must decide how to
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divide the rights internally. In essence, those aspects of the law of
the sea negotiations that deal with fisheries are concerned with the
first stage of this property right distribution.
If conservation per se was the only problem, international fisher-

ies management would be easy to achieve. The real problem is
how the distribution of the wealth of the living resources will be
affected by the exploitation program. The main portion of this
paper will discuss several of the proposed solutions to this problem
in light of their ability to bring about rational economic use of
marine fisheries. The success in each case is directly related to
preciseness of the definition of property rights.
The paper also contains three other short sections that deal with
the economic aspects of other issues of international fisheries management. Section II discusses the problem of public goods. For instance, secure property rights notwithstanding, international cooperation in research, and in the provision of such things as
weather and fish location information may be mutually beneficial to all countries concerned in terms of services provided and
cost. Section III deals with the economics of international trade
in fishing effort or in rights to fish once, or if, property rights
are defined. Finally, section IV deals with the economics of the
fisheries problem with regard to other aspects of the law of the

sea.
The purpose of this section will be to compare selected proposed
solutions to the fishery problem in the law of the sea negotiations
according to their ability to obtain an economically rational and
efficient method of harvesting the wealth from the ocean's living
resources. There are other ways in which they could be compared (such as chances for international agreement, or equity of
distribution) but these will not be directly considered here. The
final product will prove useful in providing one other element
for the contracting States to consider as they begin negotiations on
fisheries in the Law of the Sea Conference.
Although there are almost as many proposed solutions as there
are States at the negotiation table, they can be broken down for
purposes of discussion into three main categories: the species approach, the distant waters approach, and the exclusive fisheries

.

zone. Concern over new entrants, developing, and land or shelve
locked states could conceivably be considered a fourth category,
but they can easily be discussed in the context of the above three.
It is obvious that the proponents of each of the above solutions
are motivated by political and distributional goals. I am not a
lawyer nor an expert on international political science, but I think
that the United States favors the species approach to avoid recognizing any fishery zone outside territorial waters which by
"creeping jurisdictionalism" may lead to coastal States' control
over things such as the right of innocent passage. Likewise it appears reasonable to assume that those countries who favor some
type of fishing zone do so because they feel an increased portion
of the ocean's wealth will come under their control with such a
plan. Also, Japan and other distant water fishing States are opposed to zones because they stand to lose the right of free access
to some of their historical fishing grounds.
Since, in the last analysis, comparisons of these proposals on the
basis of their distributions are value judgments, none will be attempted here. Rather, as previously mentioned, the purpose is to
compare them purely on the economic rationale of their distributional characteristics, and where possible, to suggest changes such
that the same distributional objectives can be obtained without a
loss in economic efficiency.
Before any comparisons can be made, criteria for obtaining economic efficiency in harvesting the ocean's living resources must be
enunciated. In a national fishery the criteria are that additional
units of fishing effort should be applied to the fishery as long as
the value of the fish caught is greater than or at least equal to the
cost of producing the effort, and that the effort be produced as inexpensively as possible. This guarantees that fish will not be
caught if their value is less than that of the other goods that could
have been obtained had not the last unit of fishing effort been
produced.
While an open access (i.e. unregulated) fishery will produce
effort as cheaply as possible, individual boat owners will consider
only their private costs and revenues in determining how much effort to use and so additional effort will be applied to the fishery
as long as the value of average catch per unit of effort is greater
than the average cost of effort. Therefore, with no control on en2
try, too much effort will be produced.
Economic efficiency requires that effort be reduced until the cost
2. For greater detail see CusITY & ScoTT, note 1 supra.
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of the last unit of fishing effort equals the value of its catch. This
will lead to an increase in the value of total output. The value of
fishery output will fall, but by a smaller amount than the value of
other products will be increased. Attempts at reducing effort by
artificially reducing the effectiveness of the fishermen will violate
the second criterion for economic efficiency. In the economic literature the point at which these criteria hold is called maximum
economic yield, which under most conceivable cases will involve a
smaller amount of effort than
will the open access yield or the
3
maximum sustainable yield.
Since the unregulated fishery will not be operated in an economically efficient manner, it is generally agreed that there must be
some form of unified control to limit the amount of effort and to
guarantee that it is produced as inexpensively as possible. This
is not to say that all fisheries that are subject to a unified control
system will meet the economic criteria. But such a control system is necessary if those criteria are to be met.
Given that there is a unified control system, one of its major
problems is deciding who is going to cut back on effort. Unless
there is some method by which those that remain in the fishery
can be made to pay those who leave according to some agreed upon
formula, the wealth inherent in the renewable characteristics of
the fish stock is given to those who are able to continue fishing.
This is the distributional problem of fisheries management. 4
The same efficiency criteria hold for an internationally exploited
fishery, but the problem of regulation is much more complex because the distribution of the fishery can be very important in determining the value of the fish. This is because the amount that
a nation is willing to pay for marketable items is based upon their
tastes and incomes. In those cases where income earned by the
fishing industry is a significant portion of total income, the
amount people in that State are willing to pay for fish depends, in
part, upon how much fish they are able to harvest.
3. For the exception to the rule see Southey, Policy Prescriptions in
Bionomic Models: The Case of the Fishery, 80 J. POL. EcoN. 769, 769-75

(1972).
4. For a description of how Canada is trying to solve this problem
see Pearse, Rationalization of Canada's West Coast Salmon Fishery, in EcoNoMc Asp .cs OF FISH PRoDucrToN (OECD Paris, 1972).

This means that before a maximum economic yield of an international fishery can be defined, the distribution of the wealth of
the fishery must be specified. But in order for a distribution to be
chosen there must be a unified control system. Without an authority each State will try to get its "share" of the fishery by
maintaining the ability to catch it. This will involve the same
type of economic waste as was described above. The distributional
problems of regulating an international fishery are more difficult
to handle in that reductions in effort will result in shifting the
wealth of the fishery among States rather than among individuals within a State. Because of the increased chances of different
social, economic, and political factors involved in the international
case, the problem of equity is much more difficult to solve. As
was mentioned previously however, the proposed solutions to be
discussed have, explicitly or implicitly, already specified a distributional scheme for much of the ocean's wealth.
From the above it can be concluded that a definite distribution
of international fish stocks is important for two reasons. First,
such distribution must be specified before maximum economic
yields can be defined and second, without it the States will over
capitalize their fishing fleet which will cause harvesting costs to be
unnecessarily high.
The different proposals will be judged on their ability to obtain
well defined rights to the fisheries such that the proper amount of
effort can be applied in the most economical manner. (To be
complete, the cost of day to day fishery negotiations among the
States must be included in the definition of economic efficiency.)
In order for economic efficiency to be obtained, the rights must be
in terms of the wealth of the fisheries and not solely in terms of
rights of access to them. This point will be discussed in more detail later.
There are four basic types of fish stocks that must be considered
in the following analysis: 1) Those stocks that remain within an
area under the control of one State; 2) Those stocks that move
between areas under the control of two or more States; 3) Those
stocks that spend a portion of their life in areas under the control
of one or more States and the rest on the high seas (anadromous
species are usually a special case of this type); 4) Those stocks
that spend a major portion of their life on the high seas. Types 2
and 3 include special cases where the stock may be in the harvestable stage of its life in a subset of the jurisdictional areas in which
it spends its life. Obviously the classification that a certain stock
receives will depend upon the particular way in which the jurisdictional areas are determined.
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The Species Approach
For purposes of economic analysis, the main points of the species approach as put forward by the United States 5 are:
1) Coastal States are to have regulatory power over, and preferential rights to, all coastal species beyond the territorial seas off
their coasts to the limits of their migratory limits. These preferential rights will be based on the harvesting capacity of the State,
but there is no explicit mention of how they will be affected by
the growth of such capacity. The same principle applies to anadromous species that breed in the estuarine or fresh waters of a
coastal State. These States must provide access to resources not
fully utilized to other States in the following order of priority:
those that have traditionally fished the stock, other States in the
region (particularly those that are landlocked or otherwise disadvantaged), and other States. The articles state that this access
shall be "under reasonable conditions," but that the States "may
be required, without discrimination, to pay reasonable fees to defray their share of the cost of . . . regulations." Note that these
fees are only to pay regulation costs and are not meant to be a
source of wealth to the coastal State.
2) Stocks that are located in or migrate through the waters adjacent to more than one State shall be regulated by agreement
among them.
3) Highly migratory species are to be regulated by international agencies consisting of States that are engaged in fishing for
them.
4) The conservation standard is to be maximum sustainable
yield subject to relevant economic and environmental factors, and
no conservation standards can discriminate in form or in fact
against any fisherman.
At the outset there are two points that can be dealt with in brief
fashion. First, to the degree that maximum sustainable yield is
held up as the goal for management, maximum economic yield will
be prohibited. Second, the stocks that are located exclusively
within the territorial waters of a coastal State have the potential
of being rationally managed because that State has the sole right to
5. See United States Revised Draft Fisheries Article, U.N. Doc. A/AC.

138/SC II (4 August 1972).

manage them. Whether in fact it exercises that right to ensure
that the economic criteria are met is another matter. The problem,
however, is not so easy for other stocks.
The basic idea behind the species approach, the regulation of resources on the basis of biological rather than political grounds, is
sound, but this particular proposal leaves much to be desired from
an economic point of view. Its main problem is that it does not
specify the distribution of the stocks in sufficient detail, and this
will more than likely cause economic inefficiency. Consider first
the "coastal stocks." In brief, each coastal State will, under most
circumstances, be motivated to increase its harvesting capacity
at the expense of global efficiency, and if it does not do so, it is
unlikely that the allocation of the "unutilized portion of the stock"
will result in efficient production.
With regard to the first point, harvesting capacity is an elastic
yardstick in two ways. First, it is hard to define precisely what a
unit of capacity is. But more important, even in cases where a
workable definition of capacity can be reached, unless the potential long run returns from land based investments are very
high, the coastal State will be motivated to expand its capacity
until it can harvest and thereby legally control 100% of the coastal
species off its shores. While this will settle the distribution problem, in most cases it will mean that the fish will not be harvested
at the lowest possible cost because the coastal State will not necessarily be the most efficient producer of effort. But from the
individual State's point of view, if the only way to obtain property
rights to the stocks is to establish harvesting capacity, it makes
sense to do so.
However, if the coastal State may expand its capacity by entering
into joint ventures with other States (or with their nationals), the
outlook for economic efficiency is not so bleak. Since it can
make the most net revenue from such arrangements by entering
into agreements with States that can produce effort at the lowest
cost, it is likely that it will do so. Given the possibility of expanding capacity in this manner, the coastal State will have fairly welldefined property rights to the coastal species. While it can not sell
them, other countries must work through it to get a guaranteed
portion of the yearly catch.
With regard to the second main problem with coastal species,
in the event that the coastal State does not expand its harvesting capacity to the extent of the yearly possible catch, the problem of who gets the unexploited part of the resources arises. The
proscribed priorities in distributing shares may be of little use if
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the number of States in any one category desire more than the
amount left to be distributed. Therefore, although the potential
number of States involved may be smaller, there will still be
an excess demand for the stocks. This means some form of negotiation, with its attendant costs, must take place in order to
solve the problem. Admittedly, the negotiation costs may be lower
than in the complete open access because of the reduced number
of participants and the existence of a final authority in the person of the coastal State. However, even ignoring the negotiation
costs, there is no guarantee that the resulting distribution will insure that effort will be produced at the lowest possible cost,
except in the unlikely case that access to the stocks is allocated
on the basis of ability to produce effort at a low cost, or unless the
rights, once granted, are transferable. This last point will be
discussed in greater detail below.
In addition, if the restraint on the discrimination of conservation methods is interpreted to mean that the State quotas and limitations on effort from a State are not permissable (on the grounds
it is impossible for all eligible States to have a meaningful quota
or a meaningful level of effort), then the unutilized portion must
be harvested with modified open access. In that case the eligible
States will be motivated to sustain a large and powerful harvesting
capacity so that they stand a good chance in the race to harvest.
This will keep harvesting costs higher than they need be. Therefore, whether the unutilized portion is allocated on a share or on
modified open access basis, the chances of having the effort produced at the lowest cost are not good.
The discussion so far has concerned the problem of one coastal
State's management of its "coastal species," and it should be obvious that these problems expand in cases where such species are
located in or migrate through the waters off more than one
State. Certainly the prospects for economic efficiency do not improve in those cases.
Turning to the highly migratory species, the proposal is essentially no proposal at all. Allowing such species to be regulated by
the appropriate international fishery organizations, and further
specifying that these organizations shall be open to all States that
fish or even intend to fish a particular resource, is at best an extension of the status quo. The specific inclusion of those States that

intend to fish will probably make it even more difficult to reach
an economically rational agreement than it is under the present
arrangement. 6
These comments should not be interpreted to mean that international fishery regulatory agencies serve no useful purpose. Such
organizations are essential to proper management of international
species and have had a moderate amount of success in doing so,
especially from a conservation point of view. While they have
been successful in preventing extinction (either from a biological or
an economic point of view), this has come primarily at the expense
of economic efficiency. This is a result of the very nature of the
organizations. Individual countries within them are very jealous
of their rights to use the stocks and so while they may agree
to certain conservation policies (i.e. size limitations, yearly quotas,
closed seasons) it is very difficult to get them to agree to individually reduce effort. This is especially true in those cases where there
are no workable limitations on new entrants coming into the fishery
after those already there have cut back. It essentially boils down
to a problem of allocation of the stocks. No country will agree to
any conservation technique that is perceived to affect its share.
Those techniques agreed to, (see above) almost universally lead to
a global over-capacity of fishing effort as the countries involved try
to maintain "their share" of the catch.
The problem with this aspect of the U.S. interpretation of the
species approach is that it in no way improves the possibility of the
countries involved agreeing to any regulation method, much less
one that grants definite rights to the stock, which would allow for
an economically efficient use of it.
The main problem with this approach, at least regarding economic
efficiency, is that there are no adequately defined ways of distributing strong property rights. This is true for everything from coastal
to highly migratory species. The problem could be overcome by a
program that would, in part, grant exclusive rights to the coastal
stocks to the limits of their migration to the coastal State. Alternatively, the coastal State could be granted a specific portion of
each such stock (perhaps based on its harvest capacity at a specified
point in time or upon average catch over a period of time), granting
the rest to other States. But even in the latter case the coastal
State should be given full regulatory powers.
6. For a lucid discussion of the ability of existing arrangements to manage high seas stocks see Christy, Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Arrangements: A Test of the Species Approach, 1 OcAN DEv. & INTL L.J. 65
(1973).
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These rights would have to be in terms of a given percentage of
maximum economic yield, and for the program to be effective
they must be transferable. That is, the State that holds these
rights should have the alternative of catching the fish associated
with them, hiring nationals from other States to catch the fish, or
selling the rights.
Under this arrangement, the State with the regulatory powers
would determine the optimal amount of effort to be applied for a
given period (for practical purposes, a period would have to be at
least two or three years) based on the expected price of fish, and
the lowest cost of producing effort. Recall that the first criteria
for efficiency is that extra fish should be harvested as long
as the cost of doing so is less than the amount people are willing to pay for them. This would guarantee that the proper
amount of effort would be used during each period. Each State
would then have the right to produce effort in proportion to its
ownership of fishing rights. Because of the transferability, there
would be motivation to buy or sell the rights (more properly to
lease them for a given period) until effort is produced at the lowest possible cost.
To see the logic behind this, consider a State with the right to
apply a specified amount of effort to the fishery over a given period, but with an inefficient fishing industry. If the State valued
the fish then it would be to its advantage to hire effort from another State that could produce it more cheaply. The State would
gain from such a move because it would still have the fish, but
the cost of obtaining them would be less. In technical terms,
fewer resources would be needed to produce the goods to trade for
the effort than would be needed to produce effort at home. The
resources that are thus freed can be used to produce other
needed goods. On the other hand, if the State values some other
goods more than it does the fish, then it would make sense to
lease its right to fish to another country and then use the proceeds to buy those goods. Since it can not produce effort at a low
cost, it makes more sense to lease the rights than to produce the
effort and then sell the fish. Of course the States that would be
willing to buy the rights would be those that have the ability to
produce effort at a low cost. The end result of these transactions
would be to cause effort to be produced at the lowest possible
cost. Although the States that hold the rights to the fishery will

not necessrily produce the fishing effort, they will receive the
wealth that is inherent in their rights. The process of trade will
be discussed in more detail in the sub-section on resource zones
to follow. The problems of the application is the subject of Section HI.
Granted, some countries may want to use their rights as a source
of employment for certain hard to employ segments of their economy or there may be internal political restrictions on the above
described trades. To the extent that this is true, the procedure
will not result in effort being produced at a minimum cost. But
at least the possibility of it happening exists, and given enough
time to adjust to the system there is reason to believe that countries
will realize the possible gains from seeing that it does.
Turning now to the case where coastal species are located in
or migrate through the waters of more than one coastal State,
the problem of how to divide the rights between them still exists.
But once such rights are established, the problem of determining
the proper amount of effort and then allowing free trade to guarantee that it will be produced at the lowest possible cost will not
be substantially different than in the case of coastal species. The
same type of argument applies to highly migratory species once
some method of distributing the rights is found.
The Distant Water Fishing Approach
The relevant part of the distant waters approach as presented
by Japan are as follows:7
1) Developing coastal States are entitled to reserve for their
flag vessels (i.e., they have preferential rights to) that portion of
the allowable catch (which is defined to be maximum sustainable yield) of the coastal fish stocks that they have the ability
to harvest. The extent of these rights are to be determined by
agreement of the States involved on the basis of proposals made
by the coastal State. There are dispute provisions should the States
fail to agree. In determining the part of the allowable catch to be
reserved for the developing coastal State, due consideration is to be
given to the growth of its fishing capacity until it has developed the
ability to fish for a major portion (approximately 50%) of the allowable catch.
2) Developed States shall have the right to reserve to its flag
ships that portion of maximum sustainable yield necessary to
7. See Proposalsfor a Regime of Fisheries on the High Seas (Submit-

ted by Japan), U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SC IIIL. 12 (14 August 1972).
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maintain "locally" conducted small-scale fisheries. Again, the actual amount will be determined by the same type of negotiation
process used in determining preferential rights for developing
States.
3) When more than one coastal State is entitled to preferential
rights, those of each country must be agreed to by all concerned.
No limit as to their individual or combined rights is specified.
4) The coastal State shall have the right to regulate its coastal
fisheries to insure its preferential rights. The conservation methods used may not discriminate in form or in fact between fishermen of one State and those of other States. The allocations of
catch by national quota are permissible as are regulations as to
seasons, areas, permissible gear, and total stock quotas. If the
coastal State is the only one utilizing a particular fishery, it may
set its conservation measures as it wishes. However when another State enters, or even desires to enter the fishery, new conservation and distribution rules must be determined by negotiations between the two States.
5) No such preferential rights exist for anadromous or highly
migratory stocks. The conservation and regulation of these shall
be controlled by international or regional consultations and agreements.
The distant water approach as proposed by the U.S.S.R. is different from the above in that there is no limit on the growth of
the preferential rights of the developing coastal States, and anadromous fish are to be included in the preferential rights category.
Although the distributional aspects of these proposals are definitely more in favor of the distant water fishing nations than are
those of the species approach, no definite distribution program is
specified. Therefore, here again, it is doubtful that the proposal
will result in an economically rational system of utilizing the
marine fishery resources. Many of the specific criticisms of the
species approach apply here also.
Both distant water proposals will encourage coastal States to
increase their harvesting capacity (whether or not they have a comparative advantage in producing effort) in order to establish nontransferable fishing rights. The limitation of 50% of allowable
catch, will, of course, reduce the extent of this inefficiency. More

can be said on this however. First, Japan set such a limitation
in order to protect distant water fishing rights and not to reduce
wasteful overcapitalization in the coastal State. Second, in the
event that the coastal State is able to produce fishing effort at a
very low cost, limiting it to 50% of the fishing may unnecessarily
keep harvesting costs high.
With regard to that portion of the allowable catch that is not
subject to preferential rights, neither proposal scores high on economic efficiency grounds since they are subject to the same weakness in this regard as in the U.S.'s species approach. Japan's
proposal, by permitting national catch quotas, will however, enable each State the option of harvesting its quota as efficiently
as possible. That is, since they have the right to catch a specified
amount, they will not have to rush out to get their catch before
others get it. Therefore, they can develop the optimal sized fishing fleet for their catch level, and use it in the most efficient manner. However, to the extent that timing of the catch can affect
its ease of capture this is not the case.8 But unless the catch
quotas are distributed on the basis of cost of producing effort, they
will not allow for a global minimum cost of harvest.
In the event catch quotas are not used, but rather the coastal
State uses such measures as closed seasons, total quotas, etc., then
the non-preferential portion of the allowable catch will be available to all States on a first come first serve basis subject to the
rules set down in the conservation measures. This will encourage
those States to enlarge their fishing fleet so that they can remain
competitive in the race for the fish. Because of this, it is very
likely that total fishing capacity will be larger than is necessary
to harvest the allowable catch on a seasonal basis. Therefore costs
will be unnecessarily high.
With regard to highly migratory species, these proposals are
again similar to the United States' species approach and are hence
subject to the same criticisms. Japan, by removing anadromous
fish from the admittedly weak jurisdiction of the coastal State
and placing them under the control of international bodies, puts
them in a category where their distribution is even less clearly
spelled out. Therefore, the chances for proper economic utilization are reduced.
Economic FisheriesZone
The main points of the economic fisheries zone approach (as
8. For a more detailed discussion of this point see Christy, Northwest
Atlantic FisheriesArrangements, note 6 supra.
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jointly proposed by Canada, India, Kenya, and Sri Lanka) are:9
1) Each coastal State shall have the right to establish an exclusive resource zone beyond its territorial sea where it will have
sovereign rights for the purposes of exploration, exploitation, conservation, and management. While the article on anadromous species was not completed in time for presentation to the Geneva Conference, it seems reasonable to assume that they will be considered
property of the coastal State where they breed. This seems logical
in view of Canada's earlier statements on the subject. 10 No exact
distance limitation is specified although 200 miles is the one most
widely discussed at the international level.
2) The coastal State may allow nationals of other States to fish
in its exclusive zone subject to conditions and regulations which
can include payment of fees and other forms, of remuneration.
These are more than fees to cover regulation costs; they are for
the right to fish.
3) The coastal State shall allow neighboring developing coastal
and landlocked States access to this exclusive zone. The extent
of this access will be a matter of negotiation between the States involved and will be based to some degree upon the historical catches
of the neighboring States. These rights of access, once defined, are
not transferable to third parties by lease or license, by establishing joint ventures, or by any other methods.
4) Coastal States shall have preferential rights to stocks beyond its exclusive fishing zone to the extent of their harvesting capacity.
5) Stocks of limited migratory range outside of exclusive fishing zones are subject to regulation by a regional agency consisting
of representatives of nearby States. (No mention of neighboring
developing and land locked States is made in this regard.)
6) Highly migratory species outside exclusive fishing zones shall
be subject to the "authority designated for that purpose by the
Conference on the Law of the Sea."
9. See Draft Articles on Fisheries (Submitted by Canada, India, Kenya,
and Sri Lanka), U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SC. II/L.38 (10 July 1973).
10. See Management of the Living Resources of the Sea, Working Paper
Submitted by the Delegation of Canada, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SC II/L.8
(27 July 1972).

Extending the jurisdiction of the coastal State, as far as control
over fishery resources are concerned, increases the number of
stocks that are under the sole control of one authority. Therefore,
the number of stocks having the potential to be rationally managed is increased. In essence, the coastal State now has the ownship rights to the wealth of the fish stocks in its exclusive economic
zone. Assuming that the remuneration principle can be taken literally, the State can choose to take that wealth in whatever form it
deems superior. If it has a strong desire for the fish, and it is relatively efficient in producing fishing effort, then the best form
would be the actual fish caught by its own fleets. On the other
hand, if its cost of producing effort was high, and was expected
to remain so in the future, the best way to utilize the resource
would be to hire boats from other states. In that way, it could still
have the fish, but it could use its men and equipment to produce
things in which it has a comparative advantage. Finally, if it does
not desire the fish it can lease the rights to the annual allowable
catch to other states, or it can harvest the allowable catch at home
and then sell the fish depending upon its relative efficiency in producing effort. More realistically, some combination of the above
will be the most advantageous. For example, it may be most
efficient to harvest a portion of the allowable catch and then
hire effort to obtain the rest.
The particular plan chosen will depend upon the States' relative desire for the fish, which can be measured by the relative price
of fish internally as opposed to its international market price, and
upon the relative cost of producing effort internally versus that of
other States. Since the State has sole control over and receives
all proceeds from the stocks in this zone, it will be motivated to
regulate them such that no fish will be harvested that is not at
least equal in value to the cost of obtaining it, and that effort is
produced as inexpensively as possible. That is, it will be motivated by its own self interest to see that the fishery is operated according to the criteria for economic efficiency."
This is not to say that the States will actually regulate in this
manner. In fact, evidence from other nationally controlled fisheries shows that they do not. But at least they will have the option
of doing so. Under international open access or weak international
regulation such an option does not exist.
Some have argued that the zonal approach will lead to under-util11. This is not to say that these States may not use their fisheries as
a source of jobs to reduce structural unemployment, even if this may mean
a higher cost of producing effort. Such a policy, however, implicitly states
that the increase in the cost of producing effort is the least expensive way
of removing such unemployment given institutional constraints.
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ization of some stocks since the coastal States are under no compulsion to lease out rights to that part of the catch it can not harvest.
Under normal peace time conditions this should not be much
of a problem.

Once a country has an internationally recognized

right to the fish stocks in its zone, and it knows that it will not
lose control of them in any way from leasing (including the ability
to refuse to lease in the future), there will be no reason for a policy
of under-utilization.
Therefore, as far as the zonal approach grants complete control
over stocks to one State, and as long as these rights are transferable, the option of rational economic management is present.
In this light the clause that the coastal State must provide access
to neighboring landlocked and developing States, while it may
have some desirable distributional effects, will partially eliminate
this option. This is especially true in view of the fact that these
rights are nontransferable. Once the actual degree of access to the
fish stocks is determined, the only way these neighboring States
may obtain the wealth associated with their rights is to harvest
the fish. They do not have the opportunity to hire other boats to
fish or to sell the rights to other States. This will be detrimental
from both those States' points of view as well as from a global
view. Since the States are limited in the way they may use the
rights, they may not be able to use them to the maximum advantage. Also, the restriction may cause the fish to be harvested
at a less than minimum cost.
These restrictions on transferability are particularly inappropriate in that they give no benefit to the host State. That is, once specific rights are granted to the neighboring States, it is of no concern to the coastal State who actually harvests the fish or where
they will finally be consumed. Neither of these 12will affect the
harvest or use of its portion of the allowable catch.
With regard to the need of the landlocked or otherwise disadvantaged States, several aspects of a zonal approach as suggested by Afganistan, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Nepal, and Singapore are
quite interesting.' s Their approach is similar except that more
12. An exception to this would be if the timing of the catch is crucial
in determining its ultimate size or ease of harvest. See note 8 supra.
13. See Draft Articles on Resource Jurisdiction of Coastal States Beyond
the Territorial Sea (Proposed by Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Nepal, and
Singapore), U.N. A/AC. 138/SC H/L.39 (16 July 1973).

emphasis is placed on the rights of the neighboring landlocked or
coastal States which can not or do not declare a zone. They are
given the right to participate in the exploration and exploitation
of the living resources of the zones of their neighbors in an equal
and nondiscriminatory manner. It is also suggested that other
States be allowed to fish the remaining allowable catch, after
the coastal State and its disadvantaged neighbors have obtained
their "share", subject to the payment of fees. The real difference
is that the coastal State is required to contribute a certain percentage of the revenue derived from the exploitation of its
zone to an international authority which will distribute it in an
equitable manner. The exact definition of revenue is not given
but it presumably includes fees from other States which use the
zone, and perhaps some of the net revenue from its own use of it.
This particular aspect is useful because, like transferable rights
to a fish stock, it allows for the separation of rights of access from
rights to the wealth of the fishery. The problem of determining
the proper distribution is, of course, still present.
In the context of this proposal, the wealth sharing aspect may
not be completely effective because of the loosely defined rights
of the coastal States in relation to the neighboring disadvantaged
States. The concept is a good one however. If a State had sole authority over a fish stock that was subject to such a percentage fee,
it would still be motivated to operate it as efficiently as possible.
It will try to operate where its net revenues are a maximum. The
fact that it will lose a certain percentage of them to the international authority will not affect its desire to keep them as high
as possible.
Therefore, while there will be a sole authority who will be motivated to set up an economically efficient regulation program, the
total wealth from the fishery will not all go to it. This method allows for a distribution system that takes into account many States,
without setting up the economic problems that are inherent in systems which grant distributions on the basis of access.
To return to the main topic, there is a limit to the extent of the
fishery zone, and to the degree that valuable fish stocks live beyond or migrate through those limits, the zonal approach is not
completely satisfactory. In order for those stocks to be rationally
exploited, some form of unitary control must be placed over them.
Further, from earlier comments it is obvious that allowing the
coastal State preferential rights to the limit of its harvesting capacity is not a proper way to designate such authority. And while
the stipulation that only nearby States may belong to the body
that regulates regionally migrating species will limit the number of
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States involved, there is no guarantee that a proper program will
be developed. Also, since there is no clue to the make-up of the
"authority" to be designated for the purpose of regulating highly migratory species, it is impossible to discusq the chances of
their being efficiently managed. However, to the degree that it
has sole authority of such stocks, and is willing to make distributional decisions, proper economic exploitation may occur.
In summary, the main differences between the zonal approach and
the species and distant water approaches are the number of stocks
of fish that are under sole control of one State, and the optional
efficient management they provide. One may disagree with the
particular distribution entailed in such an approach, but it is
superior on efficiency grounds.
II

There are some goods and services that once produced can be
consumed by many parties simultaneously with no effect on quality. Put another way the marginal cost of allowing someone else
to consume them is zero. Some examples are military and police
protection, and the use of a road or bridge up to the point where
congestion sets in. They are called public goods in the economics
literature.
There are many public goods that are useful, and sometimes necessary, for the proper exploitation of marine fisheries. Examples
are weather information, fish location information, and research
on biological aspects of the population that are important for regulation and technological aspects of harvesting. Once information
concerning the weather conditions on the fishing grounds is available it costs nothing (other than effort of communication) to share it
with all who use the fishery. Likewise, once a new method of
harvesting is developed, its existence can be made known to all
concerned with no additional expenses.
Of course, if there are no property rights to the fishery then there
can be indirect costs of sharing these public goods. A State with
a well developed weather information system may have an advantage over another that does not in that it will be able to be
more effective in its fishing. By sharing this information they
will lose their advantage. Therefore, even if the costs of its
weather system will not be affected by making its forecast available, its fishery output will. The same reasoning holds true for

the other public goods discussed above.
This, then, is another waste of open access fishing. Each State
will find it to its advantage to keep the benefits of the public goods
it produces for its own nationals. Therefore each State will be
forced to produce them independently. This will result in a larger
amount of resources being put into the production of these goods
than is necessary. In an international fishery where well defined
property rights exist, this will not be a problem. The States involved will be assured of a certain percentage of the wealth of the
fishery. Therefore it will be to their advantage to share public
goods. In fact they will be motivated to join together in their production so that the total cost will be kept to a minimum.
In light of this, two important conclusions can be set forth.
First, to the degree that the law of the sea negotiations result in a
program for the distribution of the marine fisheries involving only
a right of access rather than a specific property right, there will be
a tendency for noncooperation in the production of fishery related
public goods. This type of allocation scheme has an inherent tendency to keep the global cost of providing these services high.
This fact should be kept in mind by the parties involved.
Second, although granting of property rights in one form or another will tend to encourage cooperation in the production of these
goods, programs for their production should be part and parcel of
the distribution agreement. This will be one way of making sure
that the problem will be handled in an adequate manner. Including
this in the program also provides a method whereby the recognized
difference between the developed and the developing States can be
considered. For example, assume that a particular fish stock is
given to two countries, one more developed than the other, on a
sound property right basis. The exact share given to the less
developed State may have been determined in some degree by its
relative condition. But the provision may also hold that the more
developed State should bear all or a large part of the costs of
providing for specified fishery related public goods. This will
benefit the other because of the increase in value of its property
rights. This increase will be the same regardless of whether the
State decides to use the rights or to lease them.
M
One of the conclusions of the first section of this paper was that
as far as the fisheries zone concept granted transferable property
rights to stocks of fish, it provided the option for rational fisheries
management. However, there can be problems in the actual imple-
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mentation of such a plan depending upon the exact characteristics
of the particular fishery and countries involved. The purpose of
this section will be to briefly discuss these potential problems.
One of the problems is that a property right does not really exist
unless it is enforceable. That is, the right to control a certain stock
of fish is meaningless unless there is some way to prevent others
from using it without proper permission. A State can not rationally
exploit a stock that is simultaneously being used by other States
which are beyond its control nor can it hope to sell or lease rights
when States can use the stock freely. Therefore, in granting property rights, it may be necessary at the same time, depending upon
certain geographical and biological conditions, to set up an international agency with recognized authority to enforce them. The
only alternative is for the individual State to police these rights by
force. This may be less than optimal in two ways. First, it may be
damaging to world peace, and second, if the cost of enforcement is
high relative to the value of the fish stocks, the net value of
the property rights are greatly reduced. Enforcement costs are an
important aspect of any conservation or distributional fishery policy,
but they are especially important in this case because of the need for
proper transferability.
Another potential problem when property rights are used as the
means of distribution is the possibility of monopoly power. If one
State is given control of a large enough portion of a certain type of
fish in any market area the monopoly power that results could result in improper management. Because the State would have control over such a large portion of the potential sales, it has control
over the selling price of the fish and thereby the leasing price of
the property right. This control is inherent in its ability to determine the actual amount of fish that are sold. The State will find it
to its advantage to keep yield below maximum economic yield in
order to maximize its profits. 14
In actuality the probability of this occurring is quite small in
view of the large number of types of fish located in geographically
dispersed areas that are good substitutes for each other, and in
view of the increasing size of the world market for most fish due to
14. For a discussion of this monopoly power see Anderson, Optimum
Economic Yield of a Fishery Given a Variable Price of Output, 30 J. or
FISH. RESEARCH BD. OF CAN. 509

(1973).

improving transportation and distribution systems. Because of
this, it would be very difficult for any one State to get significant
monopoly power over a single type of fish. However, the possibility
of it happening should be a factor to consider in choosing among
distributional proposals.
Problems may also exist because of monopsony power. If there
are only a small number of potential buyers of the annual rights to
certain fisheries that are being sold by many States, it is possible
for the buyers to combine to keep the price down or even to interfere with the regulation process. For example, assume that there
are many coastal States, each with rights to stocks of similar fish
within their fishery zones. Also assume that they are not able to
harvest all of the allowable catch efficiently, and so each desires
to sell some of the rights to fish. If there is only one potential
buyer and the total amount it wants to buy is less than the total
available for sale, it may pit the coastal States against each other
to obtain a lower price or less stringent conservation measures. The
possibility of this occurring is also small in view of the high demand that exists for protein. There may only be a small number of
distant water fishing States, but the total amount of fish that they
are willing to buy will more than likely be large enough in relation
to the quantities available for sale that their monopsony power will
be quite small, but still worthy of consideration.
IV
Although this paper has been exclusively concerned with fishery
aspects of the Law of the Sea negotiations, these aspects actually
form only one part of a complex set of issues open for debate.
Other important issues involved are the width of the territorial sea,
the width of the continental shelf, the distribution and use of nonliving resources on and under the sea bed (both within and without
the limits of the continental shelves), the right of free passage
through international straits, protection of the marine environment,
freedom of scientific research, and the rights of landlocked States.
Viewed in this light, discussions of economic efficiency of fishery
exploitation become more difficult. One reason is that in a multiple use approach, the most efficient way to manage a fishery may
not be compatible with the most efficient way of using the marine
environment as a whole. Second, because the different States have
different feelings about the importance of the issues involved,
some may view fisheries as an item to be traded off to obtain their
point of view on other issues. Each of these problems will be briefly discussed.
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The marine environment is capable of providing many types of
services. For example, certain portions of it are suitable for fisheries exploitation, deep sea mining, and ocean transport. It is
also possible that these uses may conflict with each other. Residuals from the mining process may be detrimental to the reproductive capacity of the fish stock, fixed mining platforms may block
transport lanes or restrict access of fishing boats to the stock, and
certain types of fishing gear may be incompatible with ocean transport. In these cases the programs that will maximize the net value
of using the marine environment to provide any one of these services will, more than likely, not be part of a combined program
that maximizes the sum of their net values. For example, prohibiting mining and using a specific amount of fishing effort with a certain type of gear may be the way to maximize the value of fishery
output. However, by allowing mining to proceed with certain constraints, and then readjusting the amount of effort and the type
of gear, it may be possible to increase the value of marine production such that there is a net gain. The value of fishery output may
fall, but the value of the increased mineral output will more than
make up for this decrease. These values will have to be properly
discounted to take into account any long run effect on the fishery.
Similarly, there may be a way of allowing ocean transport whereby
the increase in the value of transport services more than makes
up for any decrease in the value of mineral or fish output. Law
of the Sea negotiations which do not take these interdependencies
into account when the management programs and policies are developed will not allow for the optimal use of the marine environment.
Turning now to the possibility that fisheries issues will be considered trade-offs for other aspects of ocean use, each sovereign
State can be assumed to operate at the international negotiation
table such that it maximizes the well being (however defined) of
its citizens. The State will strive for rational use of fisheries depending upon the relative importance given to fisheries in the definition of its well being. It goes without saying that they will only
favor those rational programs that provide them with what they
consider to be their fair share of the resource.
There are two ways that trade-offs can enter the picture. First,
those States that have a relatively large interest in fisheries may
be willing to accept, and in fact may even hold out for, an econom-

ically inefficient program in which they are major gainers from a
distributional point of view. That is, they would be willing to sacrifice a certain part of potential global output through inefficiency
if they are able to obtain a relatively larger amount of the wealth
of the fisheries than they otherwise would.
Second, those States that place a higher relative importance on
other items may be willing to agree to fisheries proposals that are
really not in its best interest as far as fisheries alone are concerned
(or in the best interest of global efficiency for that matter) in
order to insure agreement on what it considers to be more important items.
These points are neither new nor need they be reason for great
concern. Even in simple groups made up of relatively homogenous
individuals, it is sometimes the case that second best alternatives
must be used as the price of securing agreement. Surely then, there
is a good case for such a procedure in a group so divergent in nature as the one developing the law of the sea. Hopefully the
States involved will be fully aware of the implications of these
trade-offs so that the correct decision can be made. This will necessitate a long and hard look at the actual losses they will be suffering as compared to the hoped for benefits of the trade-off. Careful measurement and assessment will be necessary to guarantee
that what they are gaining is truly worth more than what they are
losing.
To carry this one step further, even when a State is sure that its
individual gains will be greater than its individual costs, it should
look at the losses suffered by other States. These costs should bear
some weight in the decision making process. Hopefully the international concensus on one issue, secured through trade-offs with
other issues, will not be for a program where there is a lopsided
distribution of the gains and losses.
SUMMARY

There are many complex issues involved in the Law of the Sea
negotiations. The purpose of this paper has been to discuss the implications of various proposals with regard to the utilization of the
living marine resource on economic efficiency. Although this
should not be the overriding matter in either fishery negotiations
per se, or in all of the negotiations combined, it is important enough
that it should be directly taken into account.

